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ABSTRACT 
The Role of Gender Differences in the Relationship 
Between Guilt- and Shame-Proneness 
and Depressive Symptomatology 
by 
Julie Bingham Shiffler, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1993 
Major Professors: Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson 
Dr. Susan L. Crowley 
Department: Psychology 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role 
vii 
played by gender in the relationship between the degree of 
depressive symptomatology and levels of adaptive guilt-, 
maladaptive guilt-, and shame-proneness in a college 
population. A measure of depressive symptomatology (the 
Beck Depression Inventory) and a measure of guilt- and 
shame-proneness (the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution 
Inventory - Revised) were administered to 299 college 
students (113 males and 186 females). Females reported 
higher total levels of depressive symptomatology than 
males. Statistically significant gender differences were 
found for nine BDI items. Females also had higher levels 
of adaptive guilt-, maladaptive guilt-, and shame-
proneness. However, correlations among the three emotion 
viii 
variables and levels of depressive symptomatology were 
generally low, and the correlations for males were higher 
than those for females. The percentage of variance in 
depression accounted for by the emotion variables was also 
low. However, the hypothesized relationships were found 
in preliminary results from the 19 subjects with 
depression scores greater than 18, and implications for 
future research were discussed. The results were compared 
to past research on gender differences in depression in 
college populations, as well as previous research relating 
guilt- and shame-proneness to depression. The 
socialization of gender differences in guilt- and shame-
proneness was also discussed. 
(110 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to recent estimates, 20% of Americans 
experience a major depressive episode at some time during 
their lives, with twice as many women as men being 
afflicted. Not only does depression exact an enormous 
price from the individual in terms of human suffering, but 
the economic cost to society is estimated at more than $16 
billion annually (National Institute of Mental Health 
[NIMH], 1988). 
With few exceptions, reports in the psychological 
literature indicate that twice as many women as men are 
depressed (e.g., Lewinsohn, Haberman, & Rosenbaum, 1988; 
Myers et al., 1984; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Robins et al., 
1984; Weissman et al., 1984; Winokur, Tsuang, & Crowe, 
1982; Young, Scheftner, Fawcett, & Klerman, 1990). 
Although many reasons have been offered for the existence 
of these gender differences (e.g., biological differences, 
cultural restrictions on women, different cognitive 
styles), no explanation has yet been able to fully account 
for the greater prevalence of depression in women (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987). Therefore, a substantial need exists for 
increased understanding of possible precursors to 
depression, including reasons for the greater tendency of 
women to become depressed. This knowledge would 
facilitate the development and implementation of 
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prevention, early intervention, and treatment strategies. 
Recently, in a growing body of literature, guilt- and 
shame-proneness have been hypothesized to play critical 
causal roles in the development of depression 
(Hoblitzelle, 1988; H.B. Lewis, 1979, 1985; Smith, 1972; 
Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). Specifically , it has 
been proposed that guilt- and shame-proneness in an 
individual create an increased vulnerability to 
depression . Interest i ngly, there is theoret i cal and 
empirical evidence, albeit sparse, for gender differences 
in proneness to guilt and shame (Johnson et al . , 1987; H. 
B. Lewis, 1979; Smith, 1972), with females showing a 
greater tendency toward both emotions than males. If 
these gender differences are robust, they may explain, in 
part, differential rates of depression in males and 
females. 
To date, research that has addressed gender 
differences in the relationship between guilt- and shame-
proneness and depression in adults has been compromised by 
methodological problems. For example, many studies have 
had small sample sizes and used poor assessment 
instruments, particularly for guilt- and shame-proneness 
(Smith, 1972; Wright, O'Leary, & Balkin, 1989). The use 
of more valid measures of guilt- and shame-proneness, 
together with increased sample size, are needed both to 
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provide a more rigorous test of gender differences in 
guilt- and shame-proneness as they relate to depression in 
adults, and to reveal potentially subtle gender 
differences in the proposed relationship. 
Adequate measurement of guilt- and shame-proneness 
has been hampered in the past by disagreements about the 
definitions of guilt and shame. In this thesis, guilt 
refers to the attention given to how one's behavior 
violates normative standards. Norm violations also often 
trigger feelings of shame, but in the case of shame, the 
person focuses on the defective, worthless self and 
desires to hide rather than make active reparation. Past 
research has also failed to differentiate between adaptive 
guilt and maladaptive guilt. Adaptive guilt is a normal, 
functional emotion. It is characterized by a restless 
feeling of discomfort that occurs as a result of 
transgression and motivates the individual to make 
reparation for wrongdoing. Once the wrong has been 
corrected, adaptive guilt dissipates (Tangney, 1991). On 
the other hand, maladaptive guilt is characterized by 
excessive rumination over transgressions and 
overcompensation for misdeeds, with the accompanying 
feeling that nothing the offender does will ever fully 
atone for the wrongful deed (Ferguson & Crowley, 1993). 
When an individual repeatedly and consistently responds to 
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a variety of situations with adaptive guilt, maladaptive 
guilt, or shame, the particular emotion can be considered 
a consistent aspect or personality trait of the individual 
(Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990), and the person is 
said to be prone to that emotion. 
The purpose of the present research was to examine 
gender differences in levels of proneness to adaptive 
guilt, maladaptive guilt, and shame as they relate to 
degrees of depressive symptomatology in college students . 
This study attempted to improve upon past research in 
three ways. 
First, the research employed assessment measures 
judged to be in line with the conceptualizations of guilt-
and shame-proneness as presented here. Historically, 
studies investigating the relationship between guilt- and 
shame-proneness and depression have employed instruments 
that failed to clearly distinguish between guilt and 
shame. With newer instruments, it is now possible to 
reliably assess shame-proneness. Guilt-proneness, while 
still somewhat elusive, is also better identified in these 
instruments (Harder, 1992). 
Second, the instrument assessing guilt- and shame-
proneness used in this research was modified to capture 
the essence of maladaptive guilt-proneness, defined as 
continued rumination over one's behavior and 
overcompensation for the misdeed. In this respect, the 
present study goes beyond measuring only the socially 
appropriate function of adaptive guilt-proneness that is 
frequently tapped by currently available instruments. 
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Third, this research employed a larger sample in 
order to increase the likelihood of detecting gender 
differences in depressive symptomatology and in the 
relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
depression. Gender differences in rates of depression 
have been less consistently reported in college 
populations than in the general population (Hammen & 
Padesky, 1977; Stangler & Printz, 1980). However, a 
larger sample size may reveal existing gender differences 
not detected in previous research. In addition, previous 
researchers employing smaller samples either have not 
investigated gender differences in their study of the 
relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
depression (Hoblitzelle, 1988) or have not reported 
statistically significant gender differences in the 
relationship (Wright et al., 1989). However, no estimates 
of the magnitude of the relationships that are independent 
of sample size were used by Wright et al. Given the 
limitations of statistical significance testing and the 
methodological weaknesses of previous studies, integrating 
the results meaningfully into the literature base becomes 
problematic. 
The present research sought to establish whether 
levels of adaptive guilt-proneness, maladaptive guilt-
proneness, and shame-proneness are related to levels of 
depressive symptomatology, and whether gender differences 
exist in the relationship, by addressing the following 
research questions: 
1. Are there gender differences in the level of 
depressive symptomatology in this sample as measured by 
the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979)? 
2. Are there gender differences in the types of 
depressive symptoms endorsed on the Beck Depression 
Inventory? 
3. Are there gender differences in the levels of 
shame-, adaptive guilt-, and/or maladaptive guilt-
proneness on the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution 
Inventory - Revised (Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme, & Domingos, 
1988; T. J. Ferguson & s. L. Crowley, personal 
communication, March 1992)? 
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4. What is the magnitude of the relationship between 
shame-proneness and depression, and are there gender 
differences in the relationship? 
5. What is the magnitude of the relationship between 
adaptive guilt-proneness and depression, and are there 
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gender differences in the relationship? 
6. What is the magnitude of the relationship between 
maladaptive guilt-proneness and depression, and are there 
gender differences in the relationship? 
In light of the prevalence of depression among women 
and the proposed relationship between guilt- and shame-
proneness and depression, the following hypotheses were 
advanced: 
1. Women will report higher degrees of depressive 
symptomatology than men. 
2. A difference will exist in the types of 
depressive symptoms reported by men and women, with women 
showing a greater tendency to experience symptoms such as 
feelings of personal failure and inferiority, feeling 
guilty, feelings of being punished, disappointment in the 
self, self-criticism, and feeling unattractive. 
3. Women will exhibit higher levels of adaptive 
guilt-, shame-, and maladaptive guilt-proneness. 
4. Levels of shame-proneness and levels of 
maladaptive guilt-proneness will have a strong positive 
relationship to depressive symptoms. Adaptive guilt will 
be negligibly related to depressive symptoms. 
5. The proposed link between shame-proneness and/or 
maladaptive guilt-proneness and depression will be 
especially strong in women but not in men. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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This review will summarize the current understanding 
of the role of gender differences in the manner in which 
guilt- and shame-proneness relate to depression in adults. 
The review will begin with definitions of the constructs 
depression, guilt, shame, maladaptive guilt, guilt-
proneness, and shame - proneness. Treatment of each of the 
constructs will follow, together with descriptions of 
attempts at measurement of the constructs and any existing 
evidence of gender differences. The literature reviewed 
for the section on depression will focus on theoretical 
attempts to explain the existence of gender differences in 
depression. The literature discussed on guilt and shame 
is comprised of a discussion of the contributions of 
emotions theorists to the understanding of guilt and 
shame, recent research concerning the phenomenology of the 
two emotions, the psychological implications of guilt - and 
shame-proneness, and gender differences in guilt- and 
shame-proneness. The work of Helen Block Lewis and June 
Price Tangney, two major researchers in the area of guilt 
and shame, will be examined. Finally, literature which 
addressed guilt- and shame-proneness and depression will 
be reviewed and gaps in the current state of the 
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literature identified. 
Definitions 
Depression 
Depression is a broad term that may be considered at 
several different levels. In lay terms, depression is 
often viewed as a sad mood that occurs as a normal 
response to adversity or unpleasant events . Depression as 
a symptom refers to a lowered mood state that may be 
quantitatively more severe than circumstances warrant 
and/or qualitatively different in tone from normal mood 
fluctuations (Angold, 1988). Depressive symptoms are not 
only affective in nature, but also include behavioral, 
cognitive, and somatic changes. The syndrome of 
depression is a constellation of affective, cognitive, 
behavioral, and somatic symptoms that occur together 
(Angold, 1988; Clarizio, 1984). When the syndrome exists 
for a period of 2 weeks or more, depression as a disorder 
may be diagnosed, according to DSM-III-R criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Specifically, 
major depressive disorder is a disturbance of mood of at 
least 2 weeks' duration marked by sadness and/or extreme 
loss of pleasure in activities. At least five symptoms 
must be present during the 2-week period, including either 
or both of sad mood and loss of pleasure. Other possible 
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symptoms include feelings of worthlessness or excessive 
guilt, weight loss or gain, sleep disturbance, lethargy or 
agitation, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, and thoughts 
of suicide. For the purpose of the present research, the 
term depression will refer to depression as a symptom or 
group of symptoms, or in other words, depressive 
symptomatology. 
Guilt and Shame as States 
Emotions are considered by most theoreticians to be 
adaptive to the situation (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988). 
They play a role in determining whether and how 
information in the environment is perceived, interpreted, 
and acted upon. An emotion state is the immediate arousal 
of feeling and cognition in response to a situation. 
According to current psychological theories, the 
experiences of guilt and shame are separate but related 
emotions. They are differentiated by two factors, namely, 
the role of the self (H.B. Lewis, 1971) and the focus of 
the negative affect (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 
1992). As a result, the two emotions produce distinct 
phenomenological experiences in adults (Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992), and even in children as young 
as 7 and 8 years old (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991). 
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State of Guilt 
Guilt as a state is the feeling of discomfort that 
accompanies the realization that one has violated one's 
own moral standard. The center of attention is the 
specific behavior, often the harm done to someone or 
something. The individual, aware of having done something 
"bad," feels responsible and motivated toward setting 
things right (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). At a state level, 
guilt serves the adaptive function of motivating 
altruistic and prosocial behavior and inhibiting 
aggression (Tangney, 1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1988; 
Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, & Krupnick, 1990) . Although guilt 
may be experienced as an uncomfortable state, the focus on 
specific, and presumably controllable, behaviors apart 
from the self leaves the self-concept and identity 
virtually intact (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
State of Shame 
Shame, like guilt, is adaptive at the state level and 
functions to suppress arrogance, foster humility, and 
promote adherence or deference to group norms and 
standards of behavior. "Shame is the self's vicarious 
experience of the other's negative evaluation" (H. B. 
Lewis, 1979, p. 381). As we consider actions that would 
violate society's norms and standards, this internal 
evaluation (either conscious or unconscious) of "what 
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would others think" serves to keep our behavior within 
socially acceptable limits (Scheff, 1988). The focus of 
attention in shame is the self, and the contemplated 
behavior poses a threat to self-concept and identity. The 
desire of the self to remain worthy of respect motivates 
conformity to society's expectations. 
Shame has been described as a much more global and 
acutely painful experience than guilt (Lindsay-Hartz, 
1984; Tangney, 1989b). In shame, the entire self, not 
just the behavior, is negatively scrutinized by the self 
and found to be defective (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1990). The desire to deflect 
attention away from the exposed self produces a sense of 
shrinking and being small, and a longing to hide and 
withdraw from interpersonal contact. There is a sense of 
being worthless and powerless (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Tangney, 1989a, 1989b). 
Guilt and Shame as Traits 
There are individual differences in the extent to 
which persons experience the states of guilt and shame. 
According to the functionalist position of Malatesta and 
Wilson (1988), emotions may also function as traits. They 
contend that the natural temperament of individuals 
interacts with experience over time to develop an affinity 
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for specific emotions--an emotional style--that influences 
the way individuals perceive and interpret information 
and, in turn, the way they behave. The normal result is 
the idiosyncracies or traits that constitute individual 
personalities. However, when a person persistently relies 
on a specific affective style to organize and interpret 
experience, and thus is exposed to too much of an emotion, 
that chronic exposure can lead to pathology. Emotion 
traits serve to shape development, fac i al features, and 
personality (Fischer et al., 1990). In the case of guilt 
and shame, these emotion traits are proneness to guilt, 
which can take the form of either adaptive or maladaptive 
guilt, and proneness to shame. 
Trait of Guilt 
One of the clear weaknesses in prior research on 
guilt- and shame-proneness is that guilt has been viewed 
as serving primarily adaptive functions 1 ignoring the 
possibility that a guilt-prone orientation can serve the 
person maladaptively. The common view is that either the 
state or trait of guilt motivates the individual toward 
action that redresses the wrong, and that once the 
transgression has been repaired, the discomfort and guilty 
affect dissipate. This is what actually occurs in the 
case of proneness to "adaptive guilt," which might also be 
described as a well-developed conscience. However, in 
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what might be labeled "maladaptive guilt," the individual 
repeatedly accepts personal responsibility for negative 
events outside his or her control. In situations of 
actual wrongdoing, the offending individual believes that 
he or she can never do enough to properly atone for the 
wrongdoing. This leads to excessive rumination as the 
infraction, real or otherwise, is played out over and over 
again in the mind of the individual. The offender is 
plagued by "shoulds" and an inability to forgive the self. 
Repeated efforts to make amends are never quite sufficient 
to rid the self of the nagging memories and the painful 
affect associated with the transgression (Ferguson & 
Crowley, 1993). 
Trait of Shame 
Shame as a trait exists when the individual 
repeatedly experiences this emotion in response to a wide 
variety of situations. The person for whom shame is a 
personality trait almost continuously experiences the 
painful self-denigration and desire to withdraw or hide 
that occurs as a result of the belief that the entire self 
is defective. H. B. Lewis (1971) observed that a kind of 
humiliated fury, frequently directed against the self, may 
accompany the experience of shame as a trait, otherwise 
known as shame-proneness. 
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Guilt, Shame, and Depression: 
Theory and Research 
Depression 
At any given time, an estimated 3% of the population 
is suffering from depression (Weissman & Klerman, 1985), 
at a cost to society of more than $10 billion just in time 
lost from work (NIMH, 1988). Perhaps it is because of 
this major societal impact that a vast literature exists 
on depression. In the PsycLit database, for the years 
from January 1974 to March 1992, references to depression 
appear in 28,592 separate records. Articles addressing 
the measurement or assessment of depression number 2,638. 
Because of the enormity of the work that has been done in 
studying depression, the present review will not attempt 
to duplicate previous efforts. Rather, attention will 
focus specifically on literature addressing gender 
differences in depression. 
The existence of gender differences in depression 
rates is well documented and widely accepted (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987; Weissman & Klerman, 1985). With few 
exceptions in the literature, depression has been found to 
be more prevalent among women, and women's depression 
rates are frequently two or more times the depression 
rates of men (Weissman & Klerman, 1985). 
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A number of possible explanations for these 
differences exist, but no single explanation has yet been 
able to fully account for the predominance of depression 
in women. Biological explanations include the proposal of 
a greater genetic predisposition to the disorder in women 
(e.g., Perris, 1966) and the suggestion that women's moods 
are affected by fluctuations of hormones and other 
biochemicals (e.g., Janowsky, Gorney, & Mandell, 1967; 
Schuckit, Daly, Herrman, & Hineman, 1975). These hormonal 
fluctuations are believed to give women a greater 
predisposition to depressive symptomatology. 
From the perspective of classic psychoanalytic 
theory, Freud and his followers have hypothesized that 
penis envy plays a prominent role in women's depression 
(Mitchell, 1974). However, later psychodynamic theorists 
deemphasized psychosexual explanations and underscored 
instead the cultural restrictions placed on women because 
of their biological roles (Horney, 1967). Sex-role 
theorists suggested that women are more susceptible to 
depression because their traditional role and greater 
relationship orientation are undervalued in society (e.g., 
Miller, 1976). Not only are women who identify with the 
traditional feminine role more likely to be depressed than 
men, but women who enter the workplace are susceptible to 
depression because they experience conflicts between their 
natural desire for relationships and the pressure to be 
competitive on the job (Katz, 1975). 
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The impact that socialization has in producing gender 
differences in depression is reflected in cognitive 
theories of depression. Among the cognitive models is the 
reformulated model of learned helplessness (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). According to this view of 
gender differences in depression, women are more likely to 
attribute bad experiences to causes that are internal, 
global, and stable (i.e., themselves), and positive events 
to external, unstable, and specific factors (i.e., the 
situation) (Abramson & Andrews, 1982). As a result, they 
are especially vulnerable to depression . Beck et al . 
(1979), in their cognitive model of depression, described 
a "cognitive triad" in which depressed persons have a more 
negative view of themselves, the world, and the future. 
Because of the greater prevalence of depression in women, 
some researchers have suggested that women have a greater 
tendency than men to experience dysfunctional attitudes 
and distorted cognitions (Abramson & Andrews, 1982). 
According to the final set of explanations to be 
considered here, women differ from men in their response 
to depression. It may be that women are more willing than 
men to report their depressive symptoms and to seek help 
for their depression (Phillips & Segal, 1969; Vredenburg, 
Krames, & Flett, 1986) and thus only appear to be more 
predisposed to depression than men. An alternative 
explanation is that men and women are equally likely to 
experience depressed feelings, but that women are more 
likely than men to ruminate about their feelings of 
depression, thus amplifying their depressive symptoms. 
Men, on the other hand, tend to respond with a higher 
level of activity, which serves to distract them from 
depressive thoughts and thus attenuate their depression 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoekserna, 1987, 
1990, 1991}. 
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Whereas many of the theoretical perspectives that 
have been discussed have received at least some degree of 
empirical support, conflicting evidence also exists in 
each case. None of the above theories has been able to 
fully explain the huge discrepancy between the depression 
rates of males and females. For a more complete 
discussion of theories of gender differences in depression 
and related empirical findings, see Abramson and Andrews, 
1982, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, and Repetti and Crosby, 1984. 
Assessment of Depression 
Numerous instruments and methods have been devised 
for the assessment of depression, including self-report, 
clinician ratings, and structured interviews. 
Psychometric evidence indicates that efforts at measuring 
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depression have been reasonably successful (Shaw, Vallis, 
& McCabe, 1985). 
Self-report measures of depressive symptomatology are 
generally paper-and-pencil instruments that are completed 
by the person whose degree of depression is being 
assessed. The general format of the instruments is to 
present the subject with a number of items commonly 
associated with depression to which he or she either 
answers true or false regarding the presence of each 
particular symptom or rates each item according to its 
severity or frequency. Among the most commonly used self-
report instruments are the Self-Rating Depression Scale 
(SDS; Zung, 1965), the revised Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck et al., 1979), the depression scale of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Depression Inventory - Second 
Edition (MMPI- 2; Dahlstrom, Butcher, Graham, Tellegen, & 
Kaemmer, 1989), and the Symptom Checklist-90 - Revised 
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1975). In general, instruments 
designed to measure depression are adequate in their 
ability to do so (Shaw et al., 1985). Internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability for the above-
mentioned measures range from moderate (.69) to high 
(.96), as does concurrent validity when each instrument is 
compared with clinician ratings and with other measures of 
depressive symptomatology (.56 to .80). 
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Among criticisms of self-report instruments designed 
to measure depression are that they lack discriminant 
validity and are indicators of general emotional distress 
(e.g., anxiety or depression) rather than depression per 
se (Dinning & Evans, 1977; Meites, Lovallo, & Pishkin, 
1980), that they are affected by response sets, and that 
they do not discriminate the severity of depression. The 
advantages of self-report measures of depression are that 
most are brief and easy to admin i ster, requiring little 
professional time for administration. 
Structured interviews have the advantages of the 
added insight gained through behavioral observations and 
the clinical judgment of the interviewer, as well as 
reducing variability between interviewers. Interviews are 
conducted in a manner in which the answer to any 
particular question determines the question that will next 
be asked. Some commonly used structured interviews are 
the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia 
{SADS; Endicott & Spitzer, 1978), the Diagnostic Interview 
Schedule (DIS; Robins, Helzer, Croughan, & Ratcliff, 
1981), the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; 
Hamilton, 1960), and the Present State Examination (PSE; 
Wing, Birley, Cooper, Graham, & Isaacs, 1967). In 
general, structured interviews have demonstrated moderate 
to high interrater reliability and internal consistency 
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and moderate concurrent validity coefficients. They have 
been criticized for being time consuming and requiring 
extensive training to adminster, thus making them costly 
in terms of professional time. 
Clinician ratings are routinely made on the basis of 
DSM-III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 
1987), as outlined in the section on Definitions. 
Interestingly, both DMS-III-R criteria for major 
depressive disorder and many of the instruments and 
methods of assessing depression discussed above include 
items designed to detect feelings of guilt and shame. 
Researchers who have assessed the reliability of DSM-III-R 
diagnoses have generally made their diagnoses based on the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (SCID; 
Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, in press). Using the 
SCID, Bromet et al. (1992) obtained interrater 
reliabilities (kappa) of .70 for lifetime mood symptoms 
and .73 for mania and depression symptoms. Test-retest 
reliabilities for diagnosis of major depression ranged 
from .47 in individuals with current substance abuse 
diagnoses to .70 in individuals without substance abuse 
diagnoses (Bryant, Rounsaville, Spitzer, & Williams, 
1992) . 
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Guilt and Shame 
Guilt and shame will be addressed on a general level, 
as considered by emotion theorists, and more specifically, 
from the perspective of researchers who study and assess 
guilt- and shame-proneness. 
Guilt and Shame in Emotion Theories 
The following discussion will center on the position 
of guilt and shame in various basic emotions theories and 
on theoretical perspectives of the antecedents and 
functions of guilt and shame. 
Although guilt and shame are recognized by emotion 
theorists as important in the socialization process 
(Ausubel, 1955; Tomkins, 1979), little consensus exists 
regarding the place of guilt and shame in the hierarchy of 
emotions, or whether, in fact, guilt and shame exist as 
two separate and distinct emotions. 
Some theorists regard guilt and shame as two distinct 
basic emotions. Izard (1977) included both shame and 
guilt in his list of basic emotions while recognizing that 
they are, in many respects, closely related. However, in 
his differential emotions theory, only guilt is described 
as one of the innate emotions. Roseman, Spindel, and Jose 
(1990) included both guilt and shame in their list of 16 
discrete emotions and referred to them as "self-directed" 
emotions because the self is the identified cause of the 
events that elicit guilt and shame. 
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Other theorists have not recognized guilt and shame 
as basic emotions, but rather as subordinates to basic 
emotions. Fischer et al. (1990) and Shaver, Schwartz, 
Kirson, and O'Connor (1987) regarded shame and guilt as 
subcategories of the basic emotion "sadness," a complex 
emotion that is influenced by appraisals made on the basis 
of culture. They noted, for example, that although in 
Western cultures guilt and shame are regarded as 
subcategories of basic emotions, the Chinese view shame as 
a basic emotion. Davitz {1969) classified guilt and shame 
as negative emotions that, together with remorse, formed 
the cluster of Incompetence: Dissatisfaction. He found 
that although there were commonalities in his subjects' 
phenomenological experience of guilt and shame, guilt 
involved more rumination over what happened and a desire 
to do something to relieve the tension, whereas shame 
motivated the subject to want to withdraw and hide and 
resulted in feelings of vulnerability, helplessness, and 
emptiness. 
In contrast, Frijda (1988) defined the basic emotions 
as those that produce specific forms of action readiness. 
He thus regarded shame, which is accompanied by the desire 
to disappear from view, as one of the basic emotions. He 
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did not, however, consider guilt to be a basic emotion 
because it may result either in action aimed at undoing 
the deed or in a sort of paralysis that focuses on one's 
worthlessness. Conversely, Tomkins (1982) considered 
shame and guilt to be innate and identical at the level of 
affect, but not at the level of cognition. In his view, 
shame and guilt are experienced differently only because 
of differing cognitions related to their perceived causes 
and consequences. In guilt, the cognitions i nvolve mora l 
transgression, whereas thoughts of inferiority prevail in 
shame. 
Other researchers have examined the antecedents and 
functions of guilt and shame. Smith and Lazarus (1990) 
proposed that guilt serves the adaptive function of 
activating one's perceived social responsibility to repair 
harm done to others. At stake is a moral value , in 
contrast to a threat to the ego ideal in shame. According 
to Weiner (1986, 1990), whether an individual experiences 
guilt as opposed to shame depends upon the types of 
attributions he or she makes for an undesired outcome. If 
the occurrence in question is perceived by the individual 
as having been under personal control (such that he or she 
could have prevented it by behaving differently), then the 
individual will experience guilt. In contrast, shame is 
the result of self-related acts or characteristics that 
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the individual is helpless to alter, presumably because of 
some personal defect or deficit. In both cases, an 
internal locus of causality is necessary to the experience 
of the emotion. 
Ausubel (1955) proposed that either guilt or shame 
can occur as a result of a moral transgression. Guilt 
feelings are adaptive in that they motivate the individual 
to behave in ways that are compatible with societal moral 
values. In order for guilt feelings to occur, the 
individual must internalize standards of behavior, feel 
responsible for conforming to those standards, and be able 
to recognize discrepancies between behavior and the 
internalized standards. When such a discrepancy is 
recognized, negative self-evaluation results in feelings 
of guilt. In comparison, shame is a result of either 
actual or presumed negative evaluation by others, 
resulting in self-denigration. Shame can be either moral 
or nonmoral. Nonmoral shame is embarrassment as a result 
of a public impropriety, bodily exposure, or public 
display of ignorance or ineptitude. Moral shame, which 
occurs when others make negative moral judgments about the 
subject, can be either internalized or noninternalized, 
depending on whether the subject accepts the moral value 
upon which the negative judgment is based. For 
noninternalized moral shame to occur, the misdeed must be 
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witnessed or discovered by others. However, when moral 
shame is internalized, the reproach of others need only be 
presumed or imagined. Ausubel contended that moral shame 
is always a component of guilt, combining the external 
sanctions of real or imagined negative judgment by others 
with self-evaluation that is independent of other-
judgment. 
It is clear from this overview of emotion theories 
that there is little agreement regarding the place of 
guilt and shame in taxonomies of emotion. For the purpose 
of this research, however, guilt and shame are considered 
as separate emotions. This discussion will now turn to 
consideration of proneness to these self-evaluative 
emotions. 
Guilt- and Shame-Proneness 
In contrast to the voluminous empirical work 
available on depression, the study of guilt- and shame-
proneness is in its infancy. However, a growing interest 
in the subject is apparent in the current psychological 
literature. In addition, guilt- and shame-proneness have 
become subjects of interest in a broader context, as 
evidenced by a recent conference on shame (Las Vegas, NV, 
1991), magazine articles on the subject, and treatment in 
popular books (e.g., Borysenko, 1990; Karen, 1992; Tavris, 
1987). Nevertheless, very little empirical work has been 
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conducted in the area. Although several researchers have 
examined guilt- and shame-proneness (e.g., Fossum & Mason, 
1986; Harper & Hoopes, 1990; Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 
1992a; Potter-Efron, 1989), the work of Helen Block Lewis 
and June Price Tangney has direct bearing on the 
constructs as they are conceptualized in the present 
research and on an understanding of gender differences in 
guilt-proneness and shame-proneness. 
Helen Block Lewis. The current interest in guilt-
and shame-proneness began with the work of Helen Block 
Lewis. According to H. B. Lewis, guilt is "the relation 
of the self to transgression for which it is responsible" 
(H. B. Lewis, 1979, p. 375) and shame is "the relation of 
the self to another person in unrequited love" (p. 375). 
In H.B. Lewis's (1979) conceptualization of shame, 
the focus of negative evaluation is the self rather than 
the behavior, and identity is threatened. Because shame 
is the result of seeing the self from the viewpoint of the 
rejecting other for whom the self cares, a normal reaction 
is hostility and an attempt to humiliate the other. 
However, the other is valued by the shamed individual, and 
the thought of retaliation produces feelings of guilt. 
The only acceptable recourse is to direct the humiliated 
fury toward the self. The result may be a drop in self-
esteem, tension, or diffuse anxiety. It is because the 
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self is the "target of attack" (p. 381) that shame is a 
more devastatingly painful experience than guilt. Shame 
is more self-conscious and subjective than guilt, 
involving more autonomic reactions (e.g., blushing, 
sweating, increased heart rate). The typical response to 
shame involves lowering the head, averting the eyes, and 
wanting to disappear . Because shame has an irrational 
quality about it--producing feelings of confusion as a 
result of its relative wordlessness, its i magery o f being 
looked at, and its concrete autonomic activity--it is 
compounded by shame over being ashamed. 
In comparison, H.B. Lewis (1979) saw guilt as a more 
objective experience because it is about actions or 
thoughts for which one is responsible. In contrast to the 
passive position of the self in shame, the self in guilt 
is actively engaged in the pursuit of making amends or 
thinking about the guilt. The difficulty with guilt is in 
assessing the extent of one's responsibility, determining 
what restitution is owed, and knowing when sufficient 
reparation has been made. 
H.B. Lewis (1971) proposed that women are more 
shame-prone than men, whereas men are more guilt-prone 
than women, stating that the greater value women place on 
interpersonal relationships makes them more vulnerable 
than men to the evaluation of others, and hence to the 
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emotion of shame. In addition, Lewis saw women as more 
likely to direct their hostility inward because they were 
less aggressive than men. 
June Price Tangney. The theoretical and empirical 
work of June Price Tangney has extended and expanded upon 
the contributions of Helen Block Lewis. Tangney has 
embraced the H. B. Lewis definitions of guilt and shame, 
along with their descriptions of the phenomenology of the 
t wo emotions , and moved into the realm of testing H.B. 
Lewis's theory . Although not all of the following 
discussion of Tangney's work leads to expectations of 
gender differences in guilt- and shame-proneness, it is 
included here in order to provide an expanded base for 
understanding the two constructs. 
Guilt is viewed and operationalized by Tangney (1991) 
as a more positive, adaptive experience than shame because 
it makes the individual aware of the consequences for 
others of his or her behavior, engenders a sense of 
responsibility, and motivates compensatory behavior. 
Tangney posited that this "shame-free'' guilt requires the 
ability to distinguish between self and behavior. Because 
guilt focuses on behaviors rather than on the self, the 
experience is less threatening than shame and less likely 
to call forth defensive maneuvers (Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Shame, in comparison, lacks 
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these same boundaries (Tangney, 1991). The shame-prone 
individual may not only feel responsible for having caused 
another's distress, but may also feel the other's personal 
distress as his own or her own and shame over being the 
type of individual who would cause such injury. 
In her empirical research, Tangney (1991) found a 
weak to moderate positive relationship between gu i lt-
proneness (as she operationalized the construct) and 
empathic responsiveness . In contrast , shame-prone 
individuals were so self-focused in their experience of 
their own pain that they are unable to respond with 
empathy to the distress of others, resulting in weak 
negative correlations between shame-proneness and empathy. 
Shame-proneness was also found to be strongly associated 
with a tendency to externalize blame, perhaps in a 
defensive move against the painful affect of shame 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). This externalization 
of blame contributes to interpersonal distance and 
interferes with the ability to offer an empathic response 
(Tangney, 1991). These findings contrast with H.B. 
Lewis's (1979) contention that the hostile, humiliated 
fury of shame is most often directed against the self. 
Maladaptive guilt. Contrary to the position taken by 
Tangney (1991), guilt is not always adaptive. When the 
guilty individual is unable to let go of self-reproach for 
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the violation of a norm, feelings of guilt may be tied to 
inability to forgive the self, a feeling that is tinged 
with shamefulness. It is when guilt goes beyond 
appropriate redress to create within the individual the 
sense that he or she should do more to make amends--even 
though nothing the individual does can ever bring relief 
from the feelings of guilt--that it becomes the 
"maladaptive guilt" proposed by Ferguson and Crowley 
( 1993) . Neither H. B. Lewis nor Tangney directly 
addressed the issue of "maladaptive guilt" per se; 
however, both of them referred to it indirectly. Helen 
Block Lewis (1979) lumped guilt and shame that were evoked 
simultaneously under the category of guilt. She said that 
in such cases, guilty ideation combines with the painful 
self-reproach of shame. Thus, even after restitution has 
been made, shame functions to keep the guilty ideation 
alive. Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992), in referring 
to the concept of "shame-free" guilt, implied that guilt 
may not always be completely functional and adaptive. 
Assessment of Guilt- and Shame-Proneness 
Measurement issues have been important in the 
research on guilt- and shame-proneness. Unlike the 
depression construct, for which a long history of 
assessment exists, the measurement of guilt- and shame-
proneness is in its infancy and has been hampered by the 
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elusive nature of the constructs. Most measures to date 
have had limited ability to reliably differentiate between 
guilt and shame. This difficulty has, in part, reflected 
confusion among researchers on definitions of the 
constructs. 
Assessment of guilt-proneness historically preceded 
attempts to assess shame-proneness. However, given the 
current definitions of guilt- and shame - proneness, older 
measures of guilt-proneness are incorrectly labeled 
inasmuch as they tap into features of both shame and 
guilt. For example, Tangney (1990) stated that the guilt 
scales of the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss & 
Durkee, 1957) and the Mosher (1966) Forced-Choice Guilt 
Inventory included features of both shame and guilt. 
Historically, measures assessing both guilt- and 
shame-proneness in a single instrument have not fared much 
better than older instruments measuring only guilt-
proneness. Harder and Lewis (1987) examined the guilt and 
shame scales from Beall's unpublished situational Upset 
Scale and from the Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) coding 
system and found serious problems with psychometric 
soundness. 
Older instruments have not been alone in their 
problems with operationalizing the concepts of guilt- and 
shame-proneness. Data derived from some of the newer 
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guilt- and shame-proneness instruments have also been 
criticized for problems with reliability and validity. 
Questions have been raised regarding whether they clearly 
differentiate between the constructs and whether the 
methods of assessment actually tap into the emotions. For 
example, the measure of guilt on Harder's Personal 
Feelings Questionnaire (PFQ; Harder & Lewis, 1987) 
includes the question, "Do you feel guilty?" Obviously, 
social desirab i lity and personal interpretation may 
severely limit the utility of data derived from this type 
of self-report measure. Tangney (1990) pointed out that a 
second limitation to such a direct approach is that it 
requires the individual to make global evaluations of the 
self's emotional experience, making it essentially a 
shame-related task. The instrument may also tend to 
confound the two constructs in that it depends on the 
ability of respondents to differentiate the meaning of the 
terms guilt and shame without any descriptors of related 
phenomenology. According to Tangney (1990), the Personal 
Feelings Questionnaire appears to tap into shame-proneness 
more than guilt-proneness. 
Tangney (1990) also examined the strongest of the 
measures used in Hoblitzelle's (1988) studies. She noted 
that, according to Hoblitzelle's data, her revision of 
Gioella's (1981) Adjective Checklist lacked divergent 
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validity. In addition, there was overlapping of the shame 
and guilt factors in Hoblitzelle's (1988) Revised Shame-
Guilt Scale. 
In an attempt to overcome these limitations and to 
obtain a more valid assessment of proneness to shame and 
proneness to guilt, Tangney et al. (1988) developed the 
Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) 
for use with a college-student population. The SCAAI 
measures characteristic affective, cognitive , and 
behavioral responses associated with shame and adaptive 
guilt. Respondents are asked to imagine themselves in 
each of 13 brief scenarios typical of situations 
experienced by college students. Following each scenario, 
respondents are presented with a list of responses, among 
which are a guilt response and a shame response for every 
scenario. Respondents rate each response according to 
their likelihood of responding in that manner. The SCAAI 
has been found to yield data with acceptable reliability 
and validity in past research. For example, Tangney 
(1991) obtained internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's 
alpha) that ranged from .74 to .82 for the shame scale and 
from .62 to .70 for the guilt scale. Test-retest 
reliabilities for the shame scale were .79. The shame 
subscale of the SCAAI correlated moderately with the shame 
subscale of Hoblitzelle's (1988) Revised Shame-Guilt 
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Scale, whereas the guilt subscale of the SCAAI correlated 
moderately with the guilt subscale of the Mosher {1966) 
Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (Tangney, 1990). 
Tangney's Test of Self-Conscious Affect {TOSCA; 
Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) was created in the same 
format as the SCAAI, but to apply to older adults who are 
either working or in established family systems. It was 
designed, in part, to provide a more reliable measure of 
other constructs (e.g., externalization), in addition to 
measuring shame- and adaptive guilt-proneness. It 
contains 15 "subject-generated" scenarios that have been 
found to yield data that are equivalent or superior to the 
SCAAI in terms of reliability and validity {Tangney, 
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). 
A weakness of the two Tangney instruments is that 
guilt-proneness is defined only in a positive, functional 
way. For example, the guilt response to the SCAAI 
scenario in which a student answers a question in class 
and gives the wrong answer is, "Feel annoyed with yourself 
for raising your hand and vow to study more for the next 
class." Clearly, this response taps into the more 
adaptive components of guilt. Because other researchers 
(e.g., Malatesta & Wilson, 1988) have determined that 
guilt can be maladaptive in excess, and because Tangney 
does not label guilt-proneness as potentially maladaptive, 
36 
the application of her instruments is limited. Harder 
(1992) criticized her instruments, saying that they do not 
measure guilt well and result in very weak correlations 
with other guilt measures when the variance shared with 
shame is partialled out . 
The assessment of guilt- and shame-proneness 
continues to be a tenuous endeavor, plagued by ongoing 
difficulties with the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the constructs. 
Shame, Guilt, Depression, and Gender Differences: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Integration 
The present discussion will first examine theoretical 
perspectives on the role played by gender differences in 
guilt - and shame-proneness as they relate to depression . 
The theoretical discussion will then be followed by a 
review of related research findings. 
Theoretical Perspective 
According to Helen Block Lewis (1985), mental illness 
is the result of failure to maintain "our species' 
inherent sociability" (p. 151). Because women in general 
are more sociable than men, they experience greater 
sadness and shame over social loss. Culture devalues 
sociability, and women respond by devaluing themselves--
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thus becoming more vulnerable to shame. H. B. Lewis 
(1985) further stated that when both shame and guilt go 
unresolved, the result is symptom formation. When shame 
is the predominant emotion, with the self as the helpless 
target of hostility, the result is depression (H. B. 
Lewis, 1979). Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow 
(1992) expanded on the role of the humiliated fury of 
shame in depression, stating that when the bitter, 
resentful anger of the shamed individual is suppressed, 
feelings of depression are the result. 
Michael Lewis (1992a, 1992b) described different 
attributional patterns that contribute to gender 
differences in shame. He stated that women tend to make 
external attributions for their successes while they 
attribute their failures to internal factors. The 
attributions of men, on the other hand, are the reverse. 
He suggested that males and females also respond 
differently to the experience of shame. Men tend to not 
acknowledge their shame; instead, they either transform it 
into guilt or react defensively and express their shame 
externally with aggressive behavior. Women, on the other 
hand, internalize their shame, expressing it through 
withdrawal or depressive symptoms. Thus, women and men 
cope differently when faced with shameful feelings. 
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Research Findings 
There is growing empirical evidence that shame-
proneness is related to depression (H. B. Lewis, in press, 
cited by H.B. Lewis, 1985). Hoblitzelle (1988) found 
that two measures of shame-proneness were moderately 
correlated with a measure of depression (K = .44 and .54), 
and a weaker but statistically significant relationship 
was found between guilt-proneness and depression (K = 
.39) . Her work d i d not consider gender differences . 
Only two studies have examined gender differences in 
gu i lt- and shame-proneness as they relate to depression. 
Smith (1972) found shame-prone subjects to be more 
depressed than guilt-prone subjects, with the relationship 
stronger for women than for men. Wright et al. (1989) 
found the relationship between shame-proneness and 
depression (K = .48 for males; K = .41 for females; K 
.49 for combined sample) to be stronger than the 
relationship between guilt-proneness and depression (K = 
.22 for males; K = .18 for females; K = .18 for combined 
sample). The gender differences in the relationship were 
not significant. 
In evaluating these findings, it is important to 
consider that the assessment tools utilized by Hoblitzelle 
(1988), Smith (1972), and Wright et al. (1989) have been 
criticized by Tangney (1990) as confounding guilt and 
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shame. 
Peterson, Schwartz, and Seligman (1981) found that 
depressed women tended to blame their characters for 
negative events rather than to blame specific behaviors. 
Since blame of character can be considered a manifestation 
of shame, these findings could provide further evidence 
for the relationship between shame-proneness and 
depression in women. 
Guilt-proneness has also been found to be related to 
clinical levels of depression (Jarrett & Weissenburger, 
1990; Leckman et al., 1984; Prosen, Clark, Harrow, & 
Fawcett, 1983) and depressive symptomatology (Wertheim & 
Schwarz, 1983), although gender differences were not 
considered in the research. In each of these studies, 
guilt-proneness was assessed either by clinician ratings 
or by instruments which confound the guilt and shame 
constructs. 
Summary 
Guilt and shame are complex emotions that share 
certain phenomenological features while also being, in 
many respects, distinct in terms of both cognitions and 
the feeling experience. For individuals who consistently 
rely on the emotions of guilt and/or shame to organize and 
interpret experience, the emotions become personality 
traits. 
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Limited empirical evidence exists to suggest that 
women are more prone than men to both guilt and shame. 
Recent attempts to measure proneness to shame and guilt 
have resulted in more psychometrically sound instruments 
than those used historically. 
Depression has been a widely researched topic, and 
measurement of depressive symptomatology has been refined 
to the point that depression can be reliably assessed. 
Numerous theories have been generated in an attempt to 
explain the fact that twice as many women as men are 
depressed. However, no single explanation has been able 
to account satisfactorily for the disparity in depression 
rates. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that individuals 
who are prone to an excess of either shame or, to a lesser 
degree, guilt are more vulnerable to depressive 
symptomatology. However, in only two previous studies has 
the role of gender differences in this relationship been 
examined, and in only one of the studies were the 
hypothesized gender differences found. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
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Because the intent of the present research was to 
assess gender differences in levels of guilt- and shame-
proneness and depression that exist in a nonclinical 
population, the target population for this study was 
college students. The accessible population was comprised 
of male and female students in undergraduate psychology 
classes at Utah State University. Because introductory 
psychology is a required course for students across the 
spectrum of college majors, students in introductory 
psychology classes at Utah State University are fairly 
representative of the USU population as a whole. 
The research was conducted on pre-existing data which 
were collected in an introductory psychology class at Utah 
State University during winter quarter of 1992. Utah 
State University is located in Logan, Cache County, Utah, 
a small rural community. According to recent U. s. Census 
figures (U. s. Department of Commerce, 1990), the median 
age of Cache County residents is 23.7 years and 94.82% of 
the population is white. Statistics from the Bureau of 
Economic and Business Research at the University of Utah 
(1990) indicate that, in 1987, 32% of Cache County 
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residents over age 25 had completed a high school 
education, while 27.1% have completed at least 4 years of 
college. Per capita personal income for 1987 was $10,181. 
The university sample employed for the present research 
consisted of 299 men and women volunteer students. Table 
1 presents basic demographic information for the sample. 
Students were given extra credit for their participation. 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained by Dr . 
Tamara J. Ferguson (Appendix A), and data collection was 
conducted in accordance with American Psychological 
Association ethical guidelines for research wi th human 
subjects. 
Table 1 
Description of Subjects 
Age (SD) 
Religion 
Latter-day Saint 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Jewish 
Other/None/Missing 
Males 
(n = 113) 
22.08 (3 . 74) 
80.5% 
.9% 
5.3% 
0% 
13.3% 
Females 
(n = 186) 
20 . 42 (2.64) 
83.9% 
4.8% 
3.2% 
.5% 
7.5% 
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Procedure 
Students in the introductory psychology class were 
informed by their instructor of the opportunity to earn 
extra credit for the class by completing several self-
report questionnaires in class during the regular class 
time. Approximately three-fourths of the students 
enrolled in the class participated in the research. The 
students were assured that the information they divulged 
would remain anonymous . Volunteers completed an informed 
consent form (Appendix B) and two self-report measures. 
Subjects completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck et al., 1979) and a revised version of the Self-
Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI-R; 
Tangney et al., 1988; revisions by T. J. Ferguson & S. L. 
Crowley, personal communication, March 1992}. The BDI and 
the SCAAI-R were administered by projecting individual 
items onto a screen at the front of the classroom. 
standard instructions for both instruments were given, and 
subjects marked their answers on computer-scannable answer 
sheets. Given the administration procedure, it was not 
possible to counterbalance the order of administration of 
the two instruments. Additionally, demographic 
information (i.e., gender, age, religious preference) was 
collected and recorded on the same computer-scannable 
answer sheet. 
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Measures 
Depression 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 
1979) was used to assess depressive symptomatology 
(Appendix C). The BDI is a 21-item self-report measure of 
affective, cognitive, behavioral, and neurovegetative 
symptoms of depression. Each item presents four self-
evaluative statements from which the respondent is asked 
to select the statement that best describes his or her 
state during the past week, including the day of testing. 
Item scores range from Oto 3, with higher scores 
indicating greater symptom severity. Total scores on the 
BDI range from Oto 63, with the following recommended 
cutoff scores for different levels of depression: 0-9, no 
depression; 10-15, mild depression; 16-23, moderate 
depression; 24 and above, severe depression (Beck, Steer, 
& Garbin, 1988). 
The BDI is among the most commonly used and well-
validated measures of depressive symptomatology in 
clinical research (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978; 
Vredenburg, Krames, & Flett, 1985). It results in valid 
and reliable data when used with a college-student 
population (Beck et al., 1988). Internal consistency 
reliability estimates in college-student samples range 
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from .78 (Golin & Hartz, 1979) to .92 (Borque & Beaudette, 
1982). In college samples, the BDI was shown to have a 1-
week test-retest reliability of .78 (Oliver & Burkham, 
1979) and .64 (Zimmerman, 1986) and a 3-month reliability 
of .74 (Miller & Seligman, 1973). Ratings of concurrent 
validity range from .60 to .72 between BDI scores and 
clinical ratings of depression (Beck et al., 1988). 
Numerous additional studies reporting tests of the 
reliability and validity of BDI data are cited in the 
manual for the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 
1987). For a 25-year overview of the psychometric 
properties of the Beck Depression Inventory, the reader is 
referred to Beck et al., 1988. 
Guilt- and Shame-Proneness 
The present research utilized a revision of the Self-
Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney 
et al., 1988; SCAAI-R; revisions by T. J. Ferguson & s. L. 
Crowley, personal communication, March 1992) as the 
measure of guilt- and shame-proneness that includes 
maladaptive guilt responses. (The SCAAI was used because 
the TOSCA was not available at the time of data 
collection, and because the SCAAI was deemed more 
appropriate for college-age students.) This revised 
instrument provides a look at the comparative 
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relationships of maladaptive guilt-proneness and 
functional guilt-proneness to depression. The SCAAI 
purports to measure characteristic affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral responses associated with shame- and 
adaptive guilt-proneness. It consists of 13 brief 
scenarios characteristic of the day-to-day life of college 
students. For example, subjects are asked to respond to 
the following situation: "A friend asks you to do him/her 
a favor. Though you could reasonably go out of your way 
slightly, you just don't feel like doing it. 
him/her down. Later you tell yourself. II 
So you turn 
Following 
each scenario, respondents are offered a number of 
empirically keyed responses, each of which they rate on a 
5-point scale (where 1 represents ''not likely" and 5 
represents "very likely") as to their likelihood of 
responding in that manner. The responses to the 10 
negatively valenced scenarios indicate shame, guilt, 
externalization of cause or blame, and detachment/ 
unconcern. For example, the responses to the scenario 
presented above include: "Why am I so selfish?" (Shame); 
"I'll find a way to make up for this." (Guilt); "Some 
people expect too much from their friends." 
(Externalization); and "This kind of thing happens now and 
then between friends." (Detachment/Unconcern). 
The three positively valenced scenarios allow for the 
evaluation of guilt- and shame-proneness in instances of 
prosocial behavior. For example, subjects are presented 
with the following situation: "You and your best friend 
each submit a project to a competition. You win. 
You. II Responses indicate shame, adaptive guilt, 
externalization, pride in the self, or pride in the 
behavior. 
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The measure is scored by summing the scores for each 
scale (e.g . , shame, guilt) across scenarios. Scores for 
the adaptive guilt, maladaptive guilt, and shame scales 
range from 13 to 65, with higher scores representing 
greater proneness to the particular emotion. 
Tangney (1990) reported internal consistency of the 
four main scales (i.e., shame, guilt, externalization, and 
detachment/unconcern) ranging from .46 to .82 and test-
retest reliabilities over a 1- to 5-week period of .71 to 
.79. Studies of validity demonstrated that the SCAII data 
provided distinct indicators of guilt- and shame-proneness 
in a manner that had eluded previous measures (Tangney, 
1990). 
Because the SCAAI guilt-related responses are 
indicative of normal, functional guilt that leads to 
appropriate reparative action, an additional response 
choice was added to each SCAAI scenario for the purposes 
of this research (T. J. Ferguson & s. L. Crowley, personal 
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communication, March 1992). These additional response 
items were generated to attempt to assess the respondent's 
level of maladaptive guilt-proneness, which is 
characterized by excessive rumination over the behavior 
and overcompensation for misdeeds. For example, the 
maladaptive guilt response for the first example scenario 
is, "My friends are important to me and I should go out of 
my way to keep them happy." The maladaptive guilt 
response implies that the individual should have done that 
favor and that the only way to compensate for having 
refused the friend's request is to never again refuse to 
do a favor for a friend. Rather than providing for 
appropriate reparation, maladaptive guilt is likely to 
result in the individual's obsessing over the misdeed. 
For purposes of simplicity, the instrument to be used 
to assess adaptive guilt-proneness, maladaptive guilt-
proneness and shame-proneness will be referred to as the 
Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory - Revised 
{SCAAI-R) {Appendix D). 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
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The results of the present study are divided into 
sections that include preliminary analyses addressing the 
internal consistency reliability of the sample data and 
statistical analyses for each of the six research 
questions. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Because reliability is not inherent in the instrument 
itself, but is rather a feature of the data in hand, 
preliminary analyses were conducted to determine the 
internal consistency reliability {Cronbach's alpha) for 
the Beck Depression Inventory and the shame-proneness, 
guilt-proneness, and maladaptive guilt-proneness scales of 
the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory -
Revised. The results of these analyses are presented in 
Table 2. Acceptable levels of reliability were observed 
for each of the scales, ranging from .77 for adaptive 
guilt to .84 for shame. Because these levels were 
consistent with those previously reported for each 
instrument, further data analysis is appropriate. 
Gender Differences in BDI Scores 
In order to provide a clearer understanding of the 
Table 2 
Internal Consistency Reliability of the Measures 
(Cronbach's Alpha) 
Beck Depression Inventory 
SCAAI-R 
Shame-Proneness 
Adaptive Guilt-Proneness 
Maladaptive Guilt-Proneness 
.82 
.84 
.77 
.79 
characteristics of the sample, a histogram showing the 
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distribution of depression scores for the total sample is 
presented in Figure 1. Figures 2 and 3 present histograms 
showing the distributions of depression scores for males 
and females, respectively. 
The first research question addressed the hypothesis 
that women would report higher levels of depressive 
symptomatology than men. Table 3 presents the mean scores 
on the Beck Depression Inventory for males, females, and 
the total sample. At test for independent means was 
conducted to determine the statistical significance of 
differences between the mean scores of males and females 
on the BDI. Females were found to have a statistically 
significantly higher mean level of depressive 
symptomatology than males (p < .001). An effect size was 
calculated using the standardized mean difference (SMD) in 
order to estimate the practical importance of the 
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Figure 3. Distribution of BDI scores for females . 
difference between the means, independent of sample size. 
The mean score of the females was found to be .40 SD 
greater than the mean score of the males. Briefly, SMDs 
are an estimate of the practical significance of the 
Table 3 
Mean Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory 8 
Mean 
Males 6.82 
Females 9.13* 
Total 8.26 
"Possible scores range from Oto 63. 
*£ < .001, two-tailed probability 
SD 
5.89 
5.64 
5.83 
SMD 
.40** 
**Standardized Mean Difference between the scores of males and the 
scores of females 
findings without the confounding effects of sample size 
(Stevens, 1990). Although a certain amount of ambiguity 
exists in the interpretation of effect sizes, Stevens 
(1990) suggested that effect sizes of .2 be considered 
small, .5 as medium, and greater than .8 as large. 
Therefore, the standardized mean difference in the 
depression scores of males and females appeared 
sufficiently large to suggest that the females in the 
sample truly acknowledged experiencing significantly 
more symptoms of depression than the males. 
Gender Differences in Depressive Symptoms 
53 
The hypothesis that there would be gender differences 
in the types of symptoms endorsed on the BDI was 
considered from both a multivariate and a univariate 
perspective. First, in order to reduce the unacceptably 
high risk of experiment-wise error that would have 
resulted from 21 different t tests, discriminant analysis 
was employed to maximize the difference between males and 
females and to evaluate whether males and females could be 
differentiated on the basis of specific depressive 
symptoms. The direct entry method, which considers all of 
the variables simultaneously, was used. Results of the 
discriminant analysis are presented in Table 4, including 
the structure coefficients (i.e., the pooled-within-groups 
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Table 4 
BDI Discriminant Function Differentiating Males and 
Females 
1. Sadness 
2. Discouragement/hopeless about future 
3. Feelings of failure 
4. Little or no satisfaction 
5. Guilt feelings 
6. Feelings of being punished 
7. Self-disappointment, disgust, hate 
8. Self-criticism/blame 
9. Suicidal ideation or intent 
10. Crying 
11. Irritability 
12. Loss of interest 
13. Difficulty making decisions 
14. Unhappiness with personal appearance 
15. Decreased ability to work 
16. Sleep difficulties 
17. Fatigue 
18. Decreased appetite 
19. Weight loss 
20. Worry about physical problems 
21. Loss of interest in sex 
Structure 
Coefficient 
.37 
.12 
.15 
.18 
. 00 
-.08 
.35 
.35 
.06 
.37 
.16 
.08 
.18 
.53 
.39 
.38 
.40 
.45 
-.10 
-.02 
.15 
Function 
Coefficient 
.24 
-.18 
.00 
.09 
-.22 
-.25 
.20 
.20 
-.08 
.23 
-.06 
-.07 
-.22 
.41 
.15 
.31 
.30 
.38 
-.27 
-.25 
• 07 
correlation between the item and the discriminant 
function) and the standardized function coefficients 
(i.e., Beta weights) for each of the BDI items. Using a 
structure coefficient cutoff of .3 (Pedhauzer, 
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1982), nine items were found to discriminate most strongly 
between males and females. The nine items on which males 
and females differed appear to reflect primarily 
vegetative symptoms, decreased mood, and self-derogation. 
The discriminant function correctly classified 79 of the 
males (69 . 9%), 113 of the females (60.8%), and 192 of the 
total number of subjects (64.21%). The discriminant 
function thus improves upon chance designation by 19.9% 
for the males, 10.8% for the females, and 14.21% for the 
sample as a whole. 
Follow-up univariate analyses were also conducted. 
These analyses supported the results of the discriminant 
analysis, revealing statistically significant gender 
differences for the same nine items that were identified 
by the discriminant analysis as differentiating males and 
females. Mean item scores for males and females and the 
univariate effect size (standardized mean difference; SMD) 
for each BDI item are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Mean BDI Item Scoresa 
Mean {SD) 
Item Males Females l2. SMD 
1. Sadness .24 ( . 50) .40 (. 53) .01 .30 
2. Discouragement or hopeless about future .34 (.58) .39 (. 55) .40 .09 
3. Feelings of failure .29 (. 62) .37 (.64) .30 .13 
4. Little or no satisfaction .39 (.66) .48 (. 65) .23 .14 
5. Guilt feelings .32 (. 57) .32 (. 52) .98 0 
6. Feelings of being punished .31 (. 72) .37 (.55) .61 .10 
7. Self-disappointment, disgust, or hate .38 (. 60) .55 (. 57) .02 .29 
8. Self-criticism and/or blame .66 (.64) .84 (. 63) .02 .28 
9. Suicidal ideation or intent .15 (. 45) .17 (.39) .66 .05 
10. Crying .27 (. 76) .51 (.76) . 01 .19 
11. Irritability .58 (. 72) .67 (. 75) .27 .12 
12. Loss of interest .27 (. 50) .30 (.49) .59 .06 
13. Difficulty making decisions . 34 (. 59) .43 (.63) .20 .15 
14. Unhappiness with personal appearance .26 (. 56) .59 (.87) .0005 .43 
(table continues) 
Ul 
O'I 
Mean LfilD 
Item Males Females 
15. Decreased ability to work .35 (. 57) .SS (. 65) 
16. Sleep difficulties .33 (. 57) . 51 (. 56) 
17. Fatigue .54 (.58) .74 (.62) 
18. Decreased appetite .19 (. 42) .41 (. 66) 
19. Weight loss .12 (.54) .09 (.38) 
20. Worry about physical problems .35 (. 53) .34 (. 53) 
21. Loss of interest in sex .13 (.49) .20 (.51) 
"Possible item scores range from Oto 3. 
e. 
.007 
.009 
.006 
.02 
.48 
.88 
.30 
SMD 
.32 
.31 
.33 
.36 
.07 
.02 
.14 
Ul 
-..J 
Gender Differences in Shame-, Guilt-, and 
Maladaptive Guilt-Proneness 
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To test the hypothesis that gender differences in 
levels of shame-proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and 
maladaptive guilt-proneness exist, a one-way multivariate 
analysis of variance was conducted. Statistically 
significant gender differences were detected, E (df 3, 
295) = 24.69, 2 < .0005. A multivariate effect size 
(multivariate eta squared) of .20 was calculated (Maxwell, 
1992). Multivariate eta squared estimates the percentage 
of variance in the dependent measures (i.e., shame-
proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and maladaptive 
guilt-proneness) that can be explained by knowing group 
membership (i.e., whether the subject was male or female). 
In general, eta squared values of .01 are considered 
small, .10 are moderate, and .25 are large (Stevens, 
1990). Follow-up analyses with univariate ANOVAs were 
conducted, and univariate effect sizes (standardized mean 
difference) were estimated and are presented in Table 6. 
Females were found to have significantly higher levels of 
shame-proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and maladaptive 
guilt-proneness (2 < .0005). Effect sizes (SMD) were .86 
SD for shame-proneness, .82 SD for adaptive guilt-
proneness, and .81 for maladaptive guilt-proneness. The 
effect sizes for the gender differences in shame-
Table 6 
Shame-, Adaptive Guilt-, and Maladaptive Guilt-Proneness 
Scores• 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation} 
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Scale Total Males Females 12. SMD 
Shame 36.56 31. 77 39.47 <.0005 .86 
(8.96) (8.71) ( 7. 81) 
Adaptive 46.14 42.35 48.44 <.0005 .82 
Guilt (7.40) ( 7. 52) ( 6. 32) 
Maladaptive 37.58 33.66 39.96 <.0005 .81 
Guilt (7.82) (7.82) (6.80) 
"Possible scores for each scale range from 13 to 65. 
proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and maladaptive 
guilt-proneness each approached one standard deviation. 
The practical implication of these results is that 
females, more than males, acknowledge experiencing guilt 
and shame. 
Relationships Among Shame-, Adaptive Guilt-, and 
Maladaptive Guilt-Proneness and Depression 
The hypothesis that shame-proneness and maladaptive 
guilt-proneness would each have a strong positive 
relationship to depressive symptoms, whereas adaptive 
guilt-proneness would be negligibly related to depressive 
symptoms, was tested by first calculating zero-order 
correlations between the BDI and the three scales of the 
SCAAI-R across subjects to determine the relationship for 
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the total sample. The correlation matrix for the total 
sample is presented in Table 7. Correlations were 
generally low, ranging from .16 for adaptive guilt and 
depression to .29 for shame and depression. Correlations 
were examined for nonlinearity and were found to be 
linear. Separate correlations between the emotion 
variables and depression were calculated for males and 
females. The correlation matrix for males and females is 
presented in Table 8, with correlations for females listed 
above the diagonal and for males listed below the 
diagonal. Once again, correlations were generally low, 
and the correlations for males were generally higher than 
those of females. It thus appears that although females 
had both higher depression scores and higher levels of 
guilt- and shame-proneness, there was little relationship 
Table 7 
Correlations for the Total Sample Among the Emotion 
Variables and Depression 
Depression Shame 
Depression 1. 00 
Shame .29** 1.00 
Adaptive Guilt .16* .67** 
Maladaptive Guilt .24** .81** 
n = 299 
*.12 = .01, **.12 .001, one-tailed significance 
Adaptive 
Guilt 
1.00 
.66** 
Maladaptive 
Guilt 
1.00 
Table 8 
Correlations for Males and Females Among the Emotion 
Variables and Depression 
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Depression Shame 
Adaptive 
Guilt 
Maladaptive 
Guilt 
Depression .20* .01 .15 
Shame .30** .59** .76** 
Adaptive Guilt . 21 .62** .68** 
Maladaptive Guilt .23* .81** .75** 
Note. Correlations for females are above the diagonal . Correlations 
for males are below the diagonal. 
n = 113M, 186F 
*Q = .01, **Q = .001, one-tailed significance 
between the variables in this nonclinically depressed 
sample. To determine whether statistically significant 
gender differences existed in the relationships, Fisher's 
Z transformations were employed to test for the equality 
of two correlations, with a significant difference 
occurring only for the relationship between depression and 
adaptive guilt (p = .05, one-tailed significance). In 
this sample, therefore, the depression scores of males had 
a stronger relationship to levels of adaptive guilt-
proneness than the depression scores of females. 
The amount of variance in depressive symptomatology 
accounted for by each of the emotion variables alone 
(i.e., shame-proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and 
maladaptive guilt-proneness) for males, females, and the 
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total sample was determined by entering the variables into 
a multiple regression equation. The results of the 
multiple regression analyses when each of the variables 
was considered separately and when all three variables 
were considered together are shown in Table 9. For both 
males and females, shame-proneness accounted for more of 
the variance in depressive symptomatology than either of 
the other two emotion variables. The percentages were 
generally low and were, in all c ases, higher for males 
than for females. 
Table 9 
Percentaoe of Variance in Depression Accounted for by 
Emotion Variables 
Males Females Total 
Shame 8.85% 3 . 99% 9 . 68% 
Adaptive Guilt 4 . 36% 0% 2.64% 
Maladaptive Guilt 5.25% 2 .11% 5.69% 
All Emotion Variables 9.19% 6 . 13% 8.95% 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The major questions posed in the present research 
concerned whether there were gender differences in (a) 
depressive symptomatology; (b) each of the three emotion 
variables (i.e., shame, adaptive guilt, and maladaptive 
guilt); and (c) relationships between the emotion 
variables and depressive symptomatology. The research 
also considered the types of depressive symptoms for which 
gender differences existed. The following discussion will 
include a brief review and interpretation of the results, 
followed by a discussion of factors that may explain the 
results. 
Gender Differences in Maladaptive Reactions 
As predicted, females scored significantly higher 
than males on depressive symptomatology, shame-proneness, 
adaptive guilt-proneness, and maladaptive guilt-proneness. 
The hypothesis that levels of shame-proneness and levels 
of maladaptive guilt-proneness would have a stronger 
positive relationship with depressive symptoms for women 
than for men, whereas adaptive guilt would be negligibly 
related to depressive symptoms, was not supported by the 
data. 
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For all three emotion variables, the correlations 
with depression were higher for men than for women, with a 
significant difference between males and females for 
adaptive guilt. The percentage of variance in depression 
that was accounted for by each of the three emotion 
variables and all three variables considered together was 
extremely small, suggesting that the emotions of guilt and 
shame, as measured in the present research, had l i ttle 
relationship to the degree of depress i ve symptomatology in 
this nonclinically depressed population. 
Although nine depressive symptoms were found to 
discriminate between males and females, only three items 
could be considered shame-related: unhappiness with 
personal appearance; feelings of self-disappointment, 
disgust, or hate; and self-criticism and/or blame. 
Contrary to the predictions, there were no significant 
gender differences on items reflecting feelings of 
failure, feelings of guilt, or feelings of being punished. 
A number of observations concerning the results of 
this research are in order. First, although the finding 
of greater depressive symptomatology among females was in 
line with general population statistics, it contradicted 
the frequently cited work of Hammen and Padesky (1977), 
who found no gender differences in EDI-measured depression 
in 2,272 introductory psychology students, and Stangler 
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and Printz (1980), who found no gender differences among 
students treated for major depression (although more women 
than men were treated for dysthymic disorder). However, 
Nagelberg, Pillsbury, and Balzer (1983) reported higher 
rates of depression, as measured by the BDI, among females 
than males in a college counseling center and among class 
attenders, but not in a college infirmary. Further 
research is needed to determine whether these disparate 
findings regarding gender differences in depression in 
college populations are a result of sampling bias or the 
method used to measure depressive symptoms. Inasmuch as 
the Beck Depression Inventory was employed in two of the 
studies with diverse results (i.e., Hammen & Padesky, 
1977; Nagelberg et al., 1983), differences in the samples 
may account for the dissimilar findings. 
The possibility might be raised that the lower degree 
of depressive symptomatology among the males in the 
present research was the result of a social desirability 
bias on the part of the males. However, other researchers 
(Bryson & Pilon, 1984; King & Buchwald, 1982) in their 
consideration of this question found that male college 
students were no less willing than women to make public 
disclosure of symptoms. 
In considering the emotion variables in the present 
research, women were clearly more prone than men to shame-
proneness, adaptive guilt-proneness, and maladaptive 
guilt-proneness, conflicting with H. B. Lewis's (1971) 
assertion that whereas women are more shame-prone than 
men, men are more guilt-prone than women. 
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Perhaps the failure to find the hypothesized gender 
differences in the relationships between depression and 
the emotion variables was a function of the sample used in 
the research. Past research on guilt- and shame-proneness 
has almost exclusively employed samples composed of 
college students, whereas the theories of H. B. Lewis 
relating guilt- and shame-proneness to depression were 
based on observations of a clinical sample. The 
generalizability of college-student data to a clinically 
depressed population is, therefore, questionable. To 
illustrate, consideration of only those subjects whose 
depression scores indicated that they were experiencing 
moderate to severe depressive symptomatology (BDI > 18) 
revealed a moderate positive correlation between the 
emotion variables and depression for females and a 
moderate negative correlation between the emotion 
variables and depression for males. Although the data are 
very unstable because of the small sample size (5 males 
and 14 females), these data suggest that the role of 
gender in the relationship between guilt- and shame-
proneness and depression may be different for a clinically 
depressed population than for a nondepressed population. 
Although, judging from these preliminary results, guilt-
and shame-proneness may be factors in women's depression 
at a clinical level, they may not be good predictors of 
depressive symptomatology in a nondepressed population. 
The issues surrounding the role of these self-conscious 
emotions in clinically depressed individuals and whether 
proneness to these emotions increases the risk of 
developing a depressive disorder clearly merit further 
attention. 
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If the preliminary results that suggest gender 
differences in the relationship between the emotion 
variables and depression in a clinically depressed 
population are not simply an artifact of the sample, some 
interesting questions may be raised. Whether these 
differences are indicative of dissimilarities in premorbid 
levels of guilt- and shame-proneness (suggesting gender 
differences in the pathway to depression) or a result of 
the depression remains unanswered by the present research. 
However, it appears that there may be qualitative 
differences in the way in which men and women experience 
depression, with men's depression characterized by an 
absence of guilt- and shame-proneness and women's 
depression displaying increased levels of guilt- and 
shame-proneness. These results suggest that treatment of 
depression in females may be improved by specifically 
considering guilty and shameful feelings, both from a 
cognitive perspective and at the level of affect. For 
males, issues such as denial and the externalization of 
blame and anger may need to be a focus of treatment. 
Gender Differences and Socialization 
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Because the gender differences in guilt- and shame-
proneness were so pronounced and achieved such a high 
degree of practical significance , consideration must be 
g i ven to the source of these differences. One causal 
hypothesis raised by several researchers is the process of 
socialization. H. B. Lewis (1979) proposed that because 
girls are socialized more than boys to value and nurture 
relationships, they are more vulnerable to guilt when they 
perceive that they have harmed others. Zahn-Waxler, Cole, 
and Barrett (1991) proposed that girls receive more early 
empathy training than boys, increasing their vulnerability 
to communications that induce guilt. In their examination 
of children of depressed mothers, they found that girls 
were more empathically involved in their parents' 
relationships and experienced more guilt over parental 
conflict. Because girls are thought to identify with 
their mothers, they are more likely than boys to imitate a 
depressed mother's negative attributional style. Girls 
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are also socialized to express affection and affiliation 
and to exercise extreme control over aggression and 
feelings of anger, making them particularly vulnerable to 
feelings of guilt when they feel angry, act aggressively, 
or cause interpersonal harm (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991; 
Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1988). 
The socialization of interpersonal needs in girls and 
their assoc i ated fear of the loss of love also increase 
their vulnerability to shame (Kaufman, 1989; H. B . Lewis, 
1979). Boys, on the other hand, are socialized to value 
performance related to objects and things. When a boy 
acts aggressively, his parents may do nothing to inhibit 
his behavior, and may even encourage it. When a girl 
exhibits aggressiveness, which threatens valued 
relationships, her behavior may be met with direct 
punishment or love withdrawal (M. Lewis, 1992a), which 
elicits feelings of shame. 
M. Lewis (1992a) noted that whereas men are 
socialized to reward themselves for their successes but 
not to blame themselves for their failures, the reverse is 
true for women. The results of his research indicated 
that parents make more positive attributions to boys than 
to girls and more negative attributions to girls than to 
boys. This same pattern is also seen in the interactions 
of school teachers with their male and female students 
70 
(Minuchen & Shapiro, 1983). Girls are, therefore, exposed 
to more communications that imply that they are in some 
way deficient. M. Lewis (1992a) also proposed that 
because mothers use less physical punishment with their 
daughters than with their sons, they may employ more 
shame-inducing punishments with their daughters. It thus 
appears that women's greater vulnerability to guilt- and 
shame-proneness may, at least in part, be a result of 
differences in the socialization of girls and boys . 
Relationships Between the Emotion Variables 
and Depression 
Contrary to prediction, each of the three emotion 
variables correlated only weakly with depression, although 
the correlations of shame and maladaptive guilt with 
depression were somewhat higher than the correlation 
between adaptive guilt and depression. Because prior 
research has examined functional guilt rather than a 
maladaptive form of guilt, there is no current basis for 
comparison of the findings for maladaptive guilt. 
However, as was argued in the introduction, the stronger 
correlation for shame and depression than for adaptive 
guilt and depression is consistent with (albeit weaker 
than) the findings of previous researchers who found 
shame, more than guilt, to be central to the experience of 
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depression. For example, Hoblitzelle's (1988) two 
measures of shame correlated .44 and .29 with scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory, whereas her measures of 
guilt correlated only .16 and -.02 with BDI scores. 
Similarly, the measures of shame and guilt employed by 
Wright et al. (1989) correlated .49 and .18, respectively, 
with the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale. 
The magnitude of the relationships between shame- and 
maladaptive guilt-proneness and depression were much 
weaker than predicted , especially considering the results 
of previous research. For example, Tangney, Wagner, & 
Gramzow (1992), using the SCAAI and the BDI, obtained 
correlations of .34 and . 47 between shame-proneness and 
depression, somewhat higher than the correlation obtained 
in the present research (~ = .29). Perhaps the addition 
of maladaptive guilt responses to the SCAAI more nearly 
reflected the true-to-life responses of the subjects and 
served to dilute the attractiveness of the shame 
responses. In the absence of maladaptive guilt responses, 
some subjects with higher depression scores might have 
considered the shame response to be closer to their actual 
response than any of the other offerings. The shame-
proneness scores of subjects with higher depression scores 
might, therefore, be lower than they would have been in 
the absence of maladaptive guilt responses, resulting in 
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lower correlations between shame-proneness and depression. 
Negative Affect and Depression 
Another question that might be raised concerning this 
research involves the role in depression of negative 
affect in general. Clearly, excessive guilt has long been 
recognized as a component of depression and is, in fact, 
part of the current DSM-III-R diagnostic criteria for a 
major depressive episode (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). The role of shame, because of its 
focus on the defective self, has recently received 
increasing attention as a factor in depression (e.g., 
Hoblitzelle, 1988; Wright et al., 1989). But perhaps 
other emotions, such as anger or anxiety, also play a 
part. Future research is needed to examine the 
contributions of other negative emotions to depression. 
Limitations of the Study 
The present study has two general limitations, the 
first of which concerns the assessment of guilt and shame. 
Although the SCAAI has accumulated a fairly impressive 
psychometric record, it lacks discriminant validity for 
the guilt and shame constructs, as evidenced by high 
intercorrelations among the emotion variables. 
Additionally, the validity of the maladaptive guilt 
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construct remains in question. Maladaptive guilt 
correlated strongly with both of the other emotion 
constructs, and especially with shame. Additional work is 
needed to determine the construct validity of maladaptive 
guilt as a separate and distinct self-conscious emotion. 
Further, the assessment of emotion constructs in general 
is imprecise, with a history of questionable success in 
operationalizing the theoretical constructs . Self-report 
measures are vulnerable to social desirability response 
sets, and recent work by Crowley and Anderson (1993) and 
Ferguson (1993) demonstrated that the results of studies 
of guilt- and shame-proneness are influenced by the choice 
of assessment strategy. Clearly, highly accurate measures 
of guilt- and shame-proneness remain as yet undeveloped, 
possibly reflecting the ongoing theoretical confusion that 
exists in the conceptualization of self-conscious 
emotions. 
The second limitation of the study involves 
generalizability of the results. The sample used in this 
research was mostly white and predominantly members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Whether this 
sample provided data similar to that which would be found 
in other college settings is uncertain. In addition, 
using data obtained from college students to generalize to 
other populations, which in this case would be clinically 
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depressed persons, is fraught with pitfalls. Clearly, the 
two populations are not equivalent. Further research is 
needed to clarify the role of gender differences in guilt-
and shame-proneness in a clinically depressed population. 
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fl';'"FOR\!FD roNSENT 
\V~ wot1ld like [O ask your cooperation in some survey research that we J.,e conducci..ng . \\ c 
are intc:rested in students ' perceptions of everyday sitLlaCions. To assess ~his, ,ve ha•.-e 
designed chrc:e brief surveys for you to fill out. 
The inter_~ion is for you to complete ~Jl three of the surveys. If you do this, you will receive 
s bonus points. However, failure co complete any one of the three surveys will result in 
O bonuspoints. 
In addition to questions about your experience i.n everyday situations, there are a fc:: .,
questions in the survey referring co background information, such as your age, sex, religi ou s 
affiliation, and the like. We are collecting chis inforr.::ation only as a means of de5c:ibinf 
the background of the people participating in the study. Please note that surveys completed 
oy you or any other participant will no be examined individually. Rather. we are interc:s, ed 
in patterns of results obtained across the entire group of people whc p::irricipace. Yo~~ 
comp!eced surveys will be created confidentially and individual scores will riot oe e,:amire .:: 
It is import:rnt for us tc pcinc out that we will ask you to write dowi1 you riame , soci2.! 
sec11rity number, and telephone number on a sheet of paper that is separate fror., the sur,,·e: . 
we do this for two reasons: First, it is important for us to be able to identify who 
panicipaced in order to give them credit. Second, we may as!-:: you and others w panicipa,e 
in a future survey. Of course, to do this, we would need co be:: able to identify and contact 
you in some wav . Please noce, however, that this information will never be associated with 
your survey. 
I ha ve re::id the above information and agree to participate in the study I understar.d tha [ 
[ m::iy ,,·ithdraw from che study withOJl adve;se con~cquences . I ur.dusur.ci cha: l "iii 
receive 5 bonus poi,Hs from my instructor for co mplct1ng th e three su0cys 
(D::icc::) 
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~~ ~ ................................... llllllam•D•ate•••••••••••• mis-
Name•--------------------- Marital Status • ______ Age • ____ Sex • ___ _ 
Occupation:------------------- Edu~ation: -----------------------
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements . After reading each group of statements carefully 
circle the number (0. l. 2 or 3) next to the one statement in each group which best describes the way you 
have been feeling the past week. including toda.y. If several statements within a group seem to apply equally 
well. circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice . 
2 
I do not feel sad. 
I feel sad. 
I am sad all the time and I can 't snap out of it . 
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
I am not particularly discouraged about the 
future . 
I reel discouraged about th e future . 
I lee! I have nothing to look forv,ard to . 
I feel that the future is hopeless a.n.d that 
things cannot improve . 
I do not lee! like a failure . 
I leel I hav e tailed more than the 
average person . 
As I look back on my We . all I can see is 
a lot ol lailw-es . 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person . 
I get as much sa tisf action out of things as I 
used to. 
I don't enjoy things the way I used to . 
! don 't get real satisfaction out of anything 
anymore. 
! am dissatisfied or bored with everything . 
I don't feel particularly guilty. 
I feel guilty a good part of the ti.m e . 
I feel quite guilty most of the time . 
! feel guilty all of the time . 
! don't feel! am bein g punished 
I feel I may be punished 
I expect to be puni s hed . 
! feel I am being punished 
I don't feel disappetnted in mysel! 
lam disappointed ,n rnysel! 
lam disgusted v,nth myself 
! hate myseU . 
10 
li 
12 0 
13 
I don't feel I am any worse than 
anybody else . 
I am critical o! myself Cor my weaknesses 
or mistakes . 
I blame myself a.ll the tim e for my fault s . 
I bla.n:.e mysel! for everything bad 
that happens . 
I don't hav e any thoughts or killing royseU . 
I have thoughts or killing mysel! . but! 
would not carry them out. 
I would like to kill m yself. 
I would kill mysel! if I had the chance 
I don't cry any more than usual 
I cry more now than I us ed to . 
! cry all the time n ow. 
I used to be a ble to cry, but now I can't cry 
even though I want to . 
I am no more irritated n ow than I ever am 
I get annoyed or initated more easily than 
I used t o . 
! feel irritated all the tim e now . 
I don't get irritated at a.ll by the things that 
used to irritate me . 
I have not lo st interest in other people 
! am less interested in other people than 
I used to be 
[ have lost most of my interest in 
other people 
I have lost au of my uHerest in o the r people 
! make decisions about as weU as 
I ever could 
I put off mak.mg decisions more than 
I used to 
I have greater dlff1cully ui ma.lu.ng 
decisions than before 
I can · l make dec ,s ,ons at all any-more 
___ Sub total Page CONTINUED ON SACK 
Copyt1gri1 :f) 1978 Dy Aaron T Beck All r19n1s reserved Pr,nteCI ,n rhe US A 
14 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to . 
I am worried that I am looking old or 
unattractive . 
I feel that there are permanent changes 
in my appearJUlce that make me look 
unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly. 
15 I can work about as well as before . 
It takes an extra effort to get started at 
doing something. 
I have to push myself very hard to do 
anything. 
I can't do any work at all . 
16 I can sleep as well as usual . 
I don't sleep as well as I used to . 
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual 
and find it hard to get back to sleep . 
I wake up several hours earlier than I 
used to and cannot get back to sleep . 
17 I don't get more tired than usual . 
I get tired more easily than I used to . 
I get tired from doing almost anything . 
I am too tired to do anything. 
18 My appetite is no worse than usual . 
My appetite is not as good as it used to be . 
My appetite is much worse now . 
I have no appetite at all anymore . 
; 19 I haven't lost much weight. if any. lately 
I have lost more than 5 pounds . 
I have lost more than 10 pound s. 
I have lost more than 15 pounds . 
I am purposely trying to lose weight by 
eatingless. Yes ___ No __ _ 
20 I am no more worried about my health 
than usual . 
21 
I am worried about physical problems 
such as aches and pains; or upset 
stomach; or constipation. 
I am very worried about physical 
problems and it's hard to think of 
much else. 
I am so worried about my physical 
problems that I cannot think about 
anything else . 
I have not noticed any recent change 
in my interest in sex . 
I am less interested in sex than I us ed 
to be . 
I am much less interested in sex n ow . 
I have lost interest in sex complet ely 
___ Subtotal Page 2 
___ Subtotal Page 1 
___ Total Score 
T P C OS]B 001 
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SCAAI-R 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in 
day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those 
situations. 
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that 
situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of 
the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people 
may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they 
may react different ways at different times. 
Please do not skip any items--rate all responses. 
A. A professor whom you admire asks a question in class. You 
raise your hand and give the wrong answer. You 
1) have the feeling that everyone 
is looking at you . 
2 ) feel annoyed with yourself for 
raising your hand and vow to 
study more for the next c l ass. 
3) think to yourself, "You win 
some, you lose some." 
4) think to yourself that it was 
a tricky question anyway. 
5) feel awful about being too 
lazy to study for class. 
1- - 2--3 - -4--5 
not likely very likel y 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likel y 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
B. Your spouse, girlfriend, or boyfriend unexpectedly has been 
treating you more lovingly lately. You respond by 
1) feeling obliged to do something 
special in return. 
2) feeling vaguely uneasy, and 
embarrassed for some 
inexplicable reason. 
3) wondering what you had done 
to deserve this and wondering 
how you could return the favor. 
4) feeling that you are a lovable 
person . 
5) thinking that you must have 
really pleased him/her by 
being thoughtful this past 
week. 
6) wondering what's put him/her in 
such a good mood. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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C. You've been helping yourself to your coworker's supply of 
chocolate without her knowledge. One day, she angrily tells 
you that she suspects someone else. She calls him/her 
inconsiderate "as usual." You 
1) make a joke about chocoholics. 
2) apologize and replace the 
chocolate. 
3) say nothing, but keep 
worrying for days about how 
badly you've behaved. 
4) avoid both coworkers. 
5) think she shouldn't leave 
people with such a temptation . 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
D. Your roommate, a good friend who rarely dates, invites you to 
attend a party with him/her and a new date. You go and 
discover that the date is not only very attractive, but is 
flirting with you. You exchange phone numbers and later say to 
yourself, 
l) "If they really wanted to 
develop a relationship, they 
would have spent the evening 
alone." 
2) "If I hadn't exchanged phone 
numbers someone else would 
have." 
3) "How could I have done that?" 
and you keep worrying about 
the whole situation. 
4) "I must be a real loser to 
have to steal my friend's 
date." 
5) "I should cancel the date 
because I could never enjoy 
myself under the circumstances." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2---3·--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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E. A friend asks you to do him/her a favor. Though you could 
reasonably go out of your way slightly to do this, you just 
don't feel like doing it. So you turn him/her down. Later you 
tell yourself, 
1) "Why am I so selfish?" 
2) "My friends are important to 
me and I should go out of my 
way to keep them happy." 
3) "I'll find a way to make up 
for this." 
4) "Some people expect too much 
from their friends." 
5) "This kind of thing happens 
now and then between friends . " 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
F. You and your best friend each submit a project to a 
competition. You win. You 
l) are pleased that you have 
such talent. 
2) think, "I should've done 
something and not let my 
friend be disappointed." 
3) think, "Boy, was I lucky!" 
4) wish you did not have to 
attend the award ceremony. 
5) are glad that you had worked 
so hard and it had paid off. 
6) worry about your best friend. 
He/she worked hard, too. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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G. While walking down the street, you see someone of the opposite 
sex looking at you with interest. You 
1) are pleased that your new 
interest in clothes is noticed 
and appreciated. 
2) feel self-conscious and 
embarrassed. 
3) enjoy the attention and feel 
more attractive. 
4) figure he/she had mistaken you 
for someone else. 
5) worry that he/she might be 
misreading your availability. 
6) think, "I shouldn't dress in 
a way that attracts attention." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
H. You and a friend are jointly responsible for your club's 
finances. Your friend is balancing the club checkbook. S/he 
finds an error made by you which makes it necessary to 
rebalance the checkbook. This is a long and tedious task. You 
say to yourself, 
1) "Why am I such a careless 
person?" 
2) "Why doesn't the bank come up 
with a better form for keeping 
track of checks?" 
3) "I bet she's mad at me," and 
then you apologize repeatedly. 
4) "It's too bad, but anyone can 
make a mistake." 
5) "I've wasted my friend's time. 
I should redo it." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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I. When visiting an elderly, very wealthy aunt who is in poor 
health, you notice a copy of her will lying open on the table. 
When she goes to the kitchen to get coffee, you quickly read as 
much as you can. Afterwards you feel 
1) that anyone who leaves a will 
in plain view expects people 
to read it. 
2) you feel badly for having 
looked at her personal papers, 
and treat her especially well 
for the rest of the afternoon. 
3) horrible about what you've done 
and would do anything to change 
it. 
4) it doesn't matter since you 
would have found out when the 
will was read anyway. 
5) you feel embarrassed and 
quickly leave as soon as 
possible. 
1--2--3 - -4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
J . While meeting your boyfriend/girlfriend's parents for the first 
time, you make a comment that they don't seem to appreciate. 
You realize too late that what you said could have been 
interpreted another way. You 
1) are convinced that you have 
insulted them and keep 
apologizing throughout the 
evening. 
2) wonder why your boyfriend/ 
girlfriend didn't clarify what 
you meant. 
3) let it pass, and move on to 
another topic. 
4) wish you could just disappear. 
5) become concerned that you may 
have offended them and try to 
undo what you'd said. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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K. You spend most of Saturday comparison shopping for a television 
set. You finally decide on a model, bring it home and install 
it. When you switch it on you find there is no sound. Highly 
annoyed, you return to the store and say a few choice words to 
the clerk. You then 
1) tell yourself that losing your 
temper was understandable under 
the circumstances. 
2) worry about having lost your 
temper and cannot watch TV 
without feeling uneasy. 
3) complain to the manager that 
clerks should make sure the 
sets work before selling them . 
4) apologize to the clerk . It 
wasn't her fault. 
5) leave the store as quickly as 
possible, avoid it in the 
future, and hope no one heard 
you. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
L . You are struggling to complete a difficult physics exam for 
which you feel unprepared. A student next to you deliberately 
holds their test paper so that you can read the answers. You 
know that person is an "A" student in physics and you quickly 
copy several answers. The next day you say to yourself 
l) "Everyone cheats. It's no 
big deal." 
2) "I'll never forgive myself 
for cheating." 
3) "I must be a really dishonest 
person." 
4) "I really feel I made a 
mistake cheating on the exam. 
I should have studied harder." 
5) "It wasn't my fault. The 
answers were given to me." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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M. A friend confides a personal secret to you. Later, in a casual 
conversation with a mutual friend, you accidentally let the 
secret slip. 
1} You tell yourself that your 
friend should have realized 
that sharing information like 
that is risky. 
2} Put it out of your mind. 
Things like this happen all 
the time. 
3) Ask yourself repeatedly what 
kind of friend you are anyway . 
4) Decide to think before you 
speak after this. 
5) Think, "What a rotten thing 
to do. I should never let 
'accidents• like that happen." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
